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ABSTRACT
In this paper we study circumstances under which it is constrained Pareto efficient for a government
to issue simultaneously bonds with non-random returns and bonds with extraneously randomized
returns to finance a stationary deficit. The model has tow types of agents with identical preferences
and endowments, but with differential access to an alternative asset. There is private information about
type, which creates an adverse selection problem. The government's bond policy amounts to non-
linear taxation, involving (self-selected) random taxation of the more advantaged type. The predictions
of the model appear to accord well with historical episodes where such government liabilities were
actually in use.
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1 Introduction
Governments with large deficits to finance often borrow in a way which
amounts to a form of price discrimination or non-linear taxation, issuing
indivisible bonds in an array of denominations or maturities, and offering
different rates of return on different types of bonds. [Calomiris (1989) pro-
vides several historical examples]. It is also common for governments with
large deficits to borrow by issuing liabilities with random rates of return.
The randomness in these returns is of three main types. First, bonds may
have an associated probability of default, which clearly makes the bond's
return stochastic. Second, any bond issued with a fixed nominal return in an
inflationary environment also has a stochastic real return unless inflation is
anticipated perfectly. Finally, history indicates that governments have often
issued bonds where the return to individuals was extraneously randomized
by an explicit lottery device, while the government faced little or no random-
ness in its interest obligations. In this paper we study circumstances under
which the intentional and explicit introduction of this type of extraneous
uncertainty by a government is constrained Pareto efficient.
There are many historical examples of bonds with extraneously random-
ized returns. In the 18th century, England and France issued bonds where,
in exchange for a capital payment, an investor received a title to a bond
plus a lottery ticket for a drawing of additional bonds. The payoff from a
"winning ticket" often provided an annual income greater than the total cap-
ital contributed. The capital contributed generally was not small, possibly
being an amount exceeding average per capita income [see Weir and Velde
(1989)]. At this same time England and France also borrowed through the
use of tontines, where a group of subscribers purchased bonds with fixed
payments divided among "survivors." With a large group of subscribers, the
government's payments displayed little randomness, but for any individual
the returns were random. Interestingly, subscribers could make the payment
contingent on the survival of someone other than themselves, and the ex-
pected returns on this type of liability were generally favorable [see Weir
(1989)]. Finally, during the American Revolution the Continental govern-
ment attempted to borrow, in Europe, through the use of so-called lottery
bonds with randomly determined returns [see Anderson (1982)].
The use of such debt instruments has often been viewed as puzzling be-
cause the necessity of a risk premium to compensate (presumably) risk averse
borrowers for randomized returns makes this an apparently expensive way
to borrow [see the discussion in Weir (1989)]. Further, one might expect
the government to be relatively better able to bear risk than individuals,
so the intentional introduction of extrinsic uncertainty by the government
merits explanation. This is especially true in the historical episodes that we
describe, because financial and insurance markets that might have allowed
individuals to diversify idio-synchratic risk were at best weakly developed.
Also, "lottery bonds" and bonds without explicitly randomized returns were
often used simultaneously. In addition, in some of the historical examples,
bonds with randomized returns were intended to be sold to relatively wealthy
investors. This contrasts with the socio-economic characteristics of partic-
ipants in recent state sponsored lottery "games" [see Clotfelter and Cook
(1990)]. Both of these features merit explanation.
We develop a stationary, two-period lived overlapping generations model
in which a government with a utilitarian social welfare function must finance
a fixed deficit of a given size. It does this by borrowing from two types of
agents that are identical in all respects but one: different agents have differ-
ent access to investment opportunities other than government bonds. This
is intended to capture a situation where wealthier investors have access to
investment opportunities not open to poorer investors, or where a govern-
ment seeks to borrow both at home and abroad, and foreign investors have
investment opportunities not open to domestic investors. Finally, agent type
and outside investment activity are private information. If agents did not
have differential access to outside investment opportunities the government
would raise revenue from all types equally. However, when the government's
deficit is sufficiently large, doing so drives agents with the best investment
opportunities (say type 1 agents) out of the bond market. This, in turn,
requires all revenue to be raised from type 2 agents, which a utilitarian gov-
ernment regards as undesirable. Thus the government raises as much revenue
as it can from type 1 agents without driving them out of the bond market,
and this requires that type 1 agents be treated preferentially. However, when
type is private information, preferential treatment of type 1 agents creates
an adverse selection problem.
The model predicts the use of a kind of price discrimination described by
Bryant and Wallace (1984) or Villamil (1988), where government liabilities
are issued in minimum denominations, and intermediation is prohibited. As
in Villamil, the solution to this problem involves the issue of multiple types
of government bonds, all of which involve price discrimination and non-linear
taxation. In our model, at least one type of bond bears a non-random return.
However, under conditions we describe, it is constrained Pareto efficient for
the government to extraneously randomize the return on the other type of
bond. Bonds with randomized returns are sold to investors with access to the
best outside investment opportunities. In particular, we show that under a
condition that amounts to a requirement that absolute risk aversion decrease
at a rapid enough rate, extraneously randomized returns are the best way to
keep type 1 agents in the bond market, given the adverse selection problem.
However, randomization is observed only if the deficit is sufficiently large.
The result that bonds with extraneously randomized returns are con-
strained Pareto efficient can also be interpreted as asserting the desirability
of random taxation. Of course the potential desirability of random taxation
in the presence of an adverse selection problem has been previously pointed
out [for instance by Stiglitz (1982)]. In our analysis, however, where the focus
is on government bond sales, the government cannot compel participation.
This makes our analysis somewhat different from that in standard taxation
models. Interpreted in a taxation context, our model could be regarded as
one in which only market activities can be taxed, and high enough taxation
drives some agents into non-market (or "underground") activities. Thus, tax-
ation must not only raise sufficient revenue, it must be designed to prevent
exit from market activities. Note that the adverse selection problem arises
in this setting if and only if voluntary participation is a binding constraint.
In our model, the government treats type 1 agents preferentially by de-
signing an asset for them with a randomized return. In contrast, the asset
designed for type 2 agents has a lower expected (but non-random) return.
Despite the fact that both agent types have identical preferences, endow-
ments, and equal access to the government's assets, the access of type 1
agents' to an outside alternative allows them to patially insure against the
bad state of nature associated with the randomized return. Type 2 agents,
having no access to the outside alternative, prefer the certain return. This
taxation policy is substantially different from that in Stiglitz where agents
differ in earning ability and it is Pareto efficient to randomize the tax on low
ability (i.e., type 2) agents. In his model, government policy is designed to
make it less attractive for high ability (i.e., type 1) agents to pretend to be
of low ability and hence to work less. Thus, in both models randomization
is optimal because it weakens a self-selection constraint and hence is welfare
improving, but the nature of the randomization policies used to affect welfare
improvements are quite different. 1
Random taxation procedures that minimize monitoring costs (e.g., stochastic auditing,
as in Border and Sobel (1987)) are also welfare improving but are unrelated to the questions
that we address. However, recent work by Scotchmer and Slemrod (1989) on random
enforcement of the tax code is indirectly related to our analysis. On page 23 they discuss
an interesting interpretation of random enforcement procedures as risky assets, but the
randomness in their model corresponds to the implicit randomness induced by inflation in
asset markets (discussed at the outset of this paper). In contrast, we are concerned with
the intentional and explicit randomization of a particular asset's returns when a riskless
asset is also available.
Finally, we briefly relate our results to two other literatures. First, in the
model that we describe, (non-optimal) extraneous uncertainty can be intro-
duced by market factors which allow sunspot equilibria to exist, as in Shell
(1977), Azariadis (1981), or Cass and Shell (1983). Our focus is different; we
describe conditions under which the government will intentionally, and on
welfare grounds, inject extraneous uncertainty into allocations. Second, in
adverse selection models where agents have identical underlying preferences,
it is generally not the case that randomization of allocations is desirable. [See,
for example, Prescott and Townsend (1984) or Arnott and Stiglitz (1988)].
In contrast, we establish the desirability of randomization in an environment
where agents have identical underlying preferences and endowments, because
different agent "types" have differential access to outside opportunities. We
return to the relationship between our work and these literatures in the final
section.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 considers non-stochastic planning problems from which
Pareto efficient consumption allocations can be derived under three alterna-
tive sets of assumptions about the constraints faced by the planner. Section
4 establishes conditions under which randomized allocations are desirable.
In both Sections 3 and 4 we describe how the government can implement the
optimal allocations. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a discrete time economy populated by an infinite sequence of two-
period lived, overlapping generations and an infinitely lived government.
Each generation is identical in size and composition, containing a contin-
uum of agents with unit mass. Within each generation there are two types
of agents, indexed by i = 1,2. Let 6
t
denote the fraction of type i agents in
each generation, with 0, > and $i + 92 = 1. In addition, there is a single
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consumption good at each date. All agents have endowment Wj of the good
in period j = 1, 2 of their life, with Wj > 0.
Agent types are differentiated by their access to a storage technology. In
particular, type 1 (and only type 1) agents have access to a constant returns
to scale technology for storing the good, where one unit stored at time t
returns x < 1 units at time t + 1. We assume that each agent can store
only his or her own good, that the type of each agent is private information
(ex-ante), and that the activity of storing the good (or the quantity stored)
is unobservable.
All agents have identical preferences, representable by the additively sep-
arable utility function u(c\) + v(c\), where c%j 6 IR+ denotes the consumption
of a type i agent at age j. We assume that u and v are strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and thrice continuously differentiable. For future reference
we define R(c) = —- J,y) , the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Finally,
let the government have an exogenously given real per capita expenditure
level of g > each period. We assume that agents derive no utility from this
expenditure. 2
The assumption that type 1 agents can store the good while type 2 agents
cannot is meant to represent the situation where a government must sell
bonds to finance a deficit, and different potential bondholders have access to
different alternative investment opportunities. This differential access limits
the ability of the government to extract resources from some agents. The
ability of type 1 agents to store the good is intended to capture in a crude way
the notion that some potential bondholders have access to better alternative
investment opportunities than others. This could occur, for instance, if a
domestic government sought to borrow from foreign investors with the option
to invest abroad (at the gross rate of return x), while domestic investors (type
2 agents) are prevented from doing so by capital controls. Alternatively, we
"Alternatively, let government expenditure affect utility in an additively separable way.
might imagine that wealthier agents have access to investment opportunities
not available to poorer agents. 3 Finally, we note that our model can be
interpreted as an economy in which direct taxation is employed, but only
"market activities" can be taxed. In this case the differential access to the
storage technology proxies for different "non-market" opportunities.
For future reference, it will be useful to have a notation for the savings
behavior of an agent who pays a lump-sum tax of Tj at age j, and faces a
certain gross rate of return on savings of r. Such an agent chooses a savings
level, s, to maximize u(wi — rx — 5) + v(w2 — r2 + rs) subject to non-negativity
constraints. The solution to this problem is given by the savings function
5 = f(wi — Ti,w2 — 72, r). Under our assumptions, and assuming interiority,
/1 > > f2 . Also, we assume that
Wi > f(wi,w2 ,x) > 0. (a.l)
Finally, we define the indirect utility function V in the standard way:
V(wi ~TU W2 ~T2,r) = U(W X - 7"! -/(•)) +U(^2 ~ T2 + rf(-)).
3 Non-random Pareto Efficient Allocations
In this section we consider planning problems under three alternative sets of
assumptions about constraints faced by the planner. In each case we restrict
attention to non-random consumption allocations.
3.1 Full Information
As a benchmark, we begin by considering the problem of a social planner un-
der full information; that is, we assume that the planner knows each agent's
3 Formally, we could let type i agents have an age j endowment of u;'-, with w\ > w\,
which resembles the situation in Villamil (1988). However, this formulation complicates
our analysis without adding any additional substantive issues, so we do not pursue it here.
type, and can observe and (if desired) prohibit storage of the good. The plan-
ner's objective is to find a stationary allocation that maximizes an equally
weighted sum of the agents' utilities subject to a resource feasibility con-
straint. Let k denote the amount of storage by a type 1 agent. Then the full
information Pareto problem can be written as follows:
Problem 3.1. For i = 1,2, choose values c\, c2 and k to maximize:
subject to:
X>.[«(4) + «(4)1
2
£0,-(cj + 4) +M < «>i + w2 -g + l xk. (1)
J=l
At an interior optimum, the solution to this problem sets
«'(<4) = »'(<4), (2)
for i — 1,2, cj = cj. for j = 1,2, and k = 0. Notice that, from equations (1)
and (2), c\ = wx - f{wu w2 - g, 1), and c2 = w2 - g + f{wu w2 - g, 1). Thus
the utility of agents under this allocation is given by V(wi, w2 — g,l).
Remark. The allocation given by the solution to Problem 3.1 is identical to
the allocation obtained by Bryant and Wallace (1984), and can be supported
as they describe. In particular, the government can prohibit goods storage,
sell bonds with a minimum real value of F and a rate of return r, and
prohibit agents from "sharing" (or intermediating) bonds. If F is chosen to
satisfy F = f(wi,w2 — #,1) and r is given by r = —jj^, then each agent
type will purchase bonds with a minimum real value of F voluntarily [when
V(w\, w2 — g, 1) > V(wi,w2 ,0)]. This policy permits the government to raise
enough revenue to cover its expenditure.
3.2 Voluntary Participation
We now assume that the planner is subject to a voluntary participation con-
straint, or in other words, that the planner cannot prevent type 1 agents from
autarchically storing the good or type 2 agents from consuming their endow-
ments. This represents the situation of a government that must finance a
deficit g by selling bonds, with the government being unable to compel bond
purchases. Alternatively, we may view this as the situation of a govern-
ment that cannot tax activities in an "underground" economy. However, we
continue to assume that the government observes agents' types directly.
The planner now solves the problem
Problem 3.2. For i = 1,2, choose c\, c2 , and k to maximize:
2>[«(4) + «(4)1
i=l
subject to: (1) and
u(c}) + v(<4) > V(w1 ,w2 ,x); (3)
"(c?) + v(4) > u(w1 ) + v(w2 ). (4)
There are three possibilities regarding the solution to Problem 3.2.
Case 1: V(wi,W2 — g,l)>V(wi,W2,x). In this case constraints (3) and
(4) are not binding. This occurs, obviously, if g is sufficiently small, in which
case the solution to Problem 3.2 is the same as the solution to Problem 3.1.
Case 2: V(wi,W2 — <7,1) < u(w\) + v{w2). In this case the constraint
set is empty. We henceforth abstract from this possibility, which occurs if g
is too large.
Case 3: V(wi,w2 ,x) > V{w\ i W2 — g,l) > u(wi) -{- v(w2 ). In this
case constraint (3) binds. This is the situation of interest to us and we
therefore focus exclusively on it. In particular, the solution in this case
satisfies constraints (1) and (3) as equalities, (2), and cl- > cj, for j — 1,2. In
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addition, k — 0. Thus, due to the government's inability to compel agents to
purchase its bonds, type 1 agents must be given incentives not to withdraw
from the bond market. Consequently, type 1 agents receive better terms than
type 2 agents. Notice, however, that since (2) holds, no inefficiencies result.
Remark. The allocation given by the solution to Problem 3.2 can be sup-
ported by the following government policy. Sell bonds to type i agents with
a minimum real value of F\ and pay each type the gross rate of return r l
on these bonds. Then F % = W\ — c\ and r* = ji?r~ hold. Type 2 agents are
prohibited from buying type 1 bonds, and intermediation is prohibited ex
cathedra. Arguments following those of Bryant and Wallace (1984) establish
that type i agents voluntarily purchase F* units of bonds of type i. It is also
easy to verify that this permits the government to raise revenues equal to its
expenditures.
3.3 Voluntary Participation and Private Information
We next consider the problem of a planner who wishes to choose non-stochastic
Pareto efficient consumption allocations but cannot compel market partici-
pation, and in addition, cannot directly observe the type of any agent. Thus,
the planner is subject to incentive compatibility constraints, as well as the
other constraints specified previously.
The planner now solves the problem
Problem 3.3. For i = 1,2, choose c\, c\ and k to maximize
E«iK4)+«(4)]
subject to: (1), (3), (4), and the self-selection constraints
u(c\) + v(c\) > u(c\) + v{<%)\ (5)
v{cl) + v(c]) > u(c\ + k) + v(c\ - xk). (6)
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Equation (5) imposes that type 1 agents (weakly) prefer (cj,^) to (cj,^). 4
Equation (6) imposes incentive compatibility for type 2 agents, since a type
2 agent taking a type 1 allocation is not able to mimic the storage of a type
1 agent. Thus such an agent consumes c\ + k when young, and c\ — xk (i.e.,
c\ less the proceeds of storage) when old.
The solutions to Problem 3.3 are of two general types.
Case 1: V{w\,W2 — g, 1) > V(w\,W2,x). In this case the allocation from
Problem 3.1 satisfies conditions (3) through (6), since c] = cj, for j = 1,2.
Case 2: V(wi, w2 , x) > V(wi, w2 —g, 1). In this case the allocation from
Problem 3.2 clearly is not incentive compatible, since cl- > cj, for j = 1,2,
and k = 0. In particular, since there is no goods storage and type 1 agents
are "better treated" than type 2 agents, all type 2 agents will claim to be
of type 1. We now focus on this case. It is apparent that if (3) holds with
equality, then (5) will be satisfied. Hence (1), (3), and (6) are the binding
constraints in Problem 3.3.
We now characterize the solution to Problem 3.3.
Proposition 1. The solution to Problem 3.3 satisfies (1), (3), and (6) at
equality. In addition, it has u'(c\) = xv'{c\), u'(c\) = v'(c\), and k > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1. The solution to Problem 3.3 has at least two interesting features.
First, as Appendix A shows, goods storage occurs. This is necessary to give
type 1 agents a utility level of V{w\,W2,x) without having type 2 agents
mimic their bond purchases. Second, since u'(c\) = xv'(c\), type 1 agents
are "on their savings functions" with respect to storage of the good. Both
of these features reflect inefficiencies due to the necessity of treating type 1
agents preferentially and the presence of private information.
4 Formally, constraint (5) should be written as u(c\) + v(c\) > V(cf, c^, z). However,
since u'(c\) - v'{c\) > xv'(c\) holds (see below), V(cl,cl,x) = u(c\) + v{c\).
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Remark 2. The solution to Problem 3.3 can be implemented as follows.
The government issues two types of bonds, and prevents agents from sharing
them. Agents who buy type 1 bonds can buy only type 1 bonds, and are
permitted to purchase at most F units (in real terms). These bonds earn
the gross return r 1 . Agents who purchase type 2 bonds must purchase at
least F2 units (in real terms), and these bonds earn the gross return r2 . The
2
government chooses F2 and r 2 to satisfy F2 = w\ — c\ and r2 = C2~^2 . The
government chooses F and r 1 to satisfy
c\=w l - f(w x -F,w2 + r l F, x)\ (7)
c\ = w2 + r
lF + xf{w l -F,w2 + r l F,x). (8)
Then by (7) and (8), type 1 agents are "on their savings functions." Type
2 agents optimally purchase F2 units of type 2 bonds, and the government
raises revenue with a per capita value of g.
4 Stochastic Pareto Efficient Allocations
We now state conditions under which extrinsic randomization can be Pareto
improving. We begin by introducing some notation, and then consider a con-
strained social planning problem that permits extraneous uncertainty. Our
objective is only to show that some extrinsic randomization is desirable, so
we proceed as follows. We assume that the planner chooses, for i = 1,2,
deterministic values c\ for young consumption, and values c2 (s) for old con-
sumption that may depend on an extraneous state s. For simplicity we let
5 £ {1,2}, and we let p £ (0,1) be the probability (which is the same in
all periods) that 5 = 1. We assume that realizations of s are independently
and identically distributed across agents, and that s is realized at the begin-
ning of old age. This is meant to capture the features of several historical
randomization devices employed in government borrowing. Specifically, as
13
we noted in the Introduction, historical evidence indicates that governments
have confronted individuals with random returns on some bonds, while the
government faced little or no (as here) randomness with respect to interest
obligations on these bonds.
We now consider the planning problem from which constrained, Pareto
efficient (possibly stochastic) consumption allocations are chosen. To simplify
notation, we will sometimes write Es h(cl2 (s)) = ph{c2 {\)) + (1 — p)h(c2 (2)),
where h(-) is an arbitrary function, and E denotes the expectation operator.
The stochastic Pareto problem can be written as follows.
Problem 4.1. Fori = 1,2 and s = 1,2, choose c\, c2 (s), and k to maximize
X>K<i) + £.»(4«)]
t'=i
subject to:
2
J2 Oi[c\ + Esc2 (s)] + $ lk<w 1 +w2 -g + 0ixk; (9)
»=i
u(c\) + E,v(4(s)) > V(wuw2 , x)\ (10)
u(c\) + Es v(c22 (s)) > u(c\ + k) + Esv(c
l
2 {s) - xk)\ (11)
u(c\) + Esv(c\(s)) > u(c\) + Esv(c22 (s)Y (12)
u(c\) + Es v(c22 (s)) > u(Wl ) -r v(w2 ). (13)
Equation (9) is the resource feasibility constraint, which reflects the fact
that there is no aggregate randomness. Equations (11) and (12) are the
self-selection constraints, and equations (10) and (13) are the voluntary par-
ticipation constraints.
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Clearly the solution to Problem 4.1 coincides with the solution to Problem
3.1 unless (10) is binding. When (10) binds, so does (11), as in the previous
section. Apparently then, (12) cannot bind, and we restrict attention to the
case in which (13) is not binding. Thus, for the remainder of the section,
constraints (9) through (11) bind. It is easy to verify in this case that the
solution to Problem 4.1 has c^(l) = 0^(2), so that only (or at most) type 1
agents face extrinsic uncertainty. This captures our observation that histor-
ically governments with large deficits have made use of lottery bonds with
attractive return distributions that are sold to agents who (presumably) have
reasonable alternative investment opportunities. Also, it is easy to check that
the solution to Problem 4.1 has u'{c\) = v'(c\). Finally, arguments identical
to those in Appendix A can be used to establish that k > holds, and that
u'(c\) = xEs v\c\(s)). (14)
4.1 Welfare Improving Randomization
We now state a sufficient condition for c^(l) ^ c\{2) to hold, so that type 1
agents face extraneous uncertainty.
Proposition 2. Suppose that — . ,.7
X
j. 2 ~^ - > —
,/ff\ holds, where c),
c\, and k are solutions to Problem 3.3. Then c\(l) ^ c\{2).
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the remainder of this section, we provide necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the inequality in Proposition 2 to hold. We then interpret our
result. In particular, we find that when the elasticity of absolute risk aver-
sion with respect to old age consumption is sufficiently large, then extrinsic
randomization is welfare improving.
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The inequality in Proposition 2 can be rewritten
> R{c\y (15)
R(c\ — xk)(l — x)v'(c\ — xk)
v
f(c\ — xk) — u'(c\ + k)
Note that .... - P~
X
,L
—rr < -r— , so it is apparent that a necessary con-
v'(cl-xk)-u'(c\+k) 1-x' rr J
dition for (15) is decreasing absolute risk aversion (with respect to old age
consumption).
We now derive a sufficent condition for (15) to hold.
Define the function G by
r( A i M . . R(c\-xk)(l-x)v'(c\-xk) .G^ C^ = Ad _ xk) _ a/ (ci + fc) - ^)" ( 16 )
Then for all values (cj,^) satisfying u'(c\) = xv'(c\), it is apparent that
G(c},C2,0) = 0. Furthermore, if G3 > 0, then for all such (c},^) pairs,
G(c\,c\,k) > whenever k > 0. Thus, G(c\,c\,k) > will hold, which is
exactly (15).
Straightforward differentiation of (16) establishes that G3 > iff
xR'icl - xk)
,
u'(c} + k)
R(c\ - xk) v'(c\ - xk) - u'(c\ + k)
{£g±f-**(4 -**)} or)
Since xv'{c\ — xk) > w'(c] + fc) for all /: > 0, a sufficient condition for
G3 (c\, c\, k) > 0, for all k > 0, is
-<
°-ffy i>*-'«-->-38jft » si
An alternative statement of (18) is obtained by multiplying both sides by
(c\ — xk) to get
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(i-x)fl'(4 *fc)(3 xk)
_,
_
_,
_
K\c[ — xk)
u c\-xk u"(c\ + k)(c\ + k)
{(
"^+T) u'fci + k) }
- (18)
Equation (18') provides the result. In particular, it asserts that Gz(c\, c\,k) >
for all k > if the elasticity of absolute risk aversion (with respect to old
age consumption, j/|'0 i 1S sufficiently large. Note that R'(-) < if the util-
ity function exhibits everywhere strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that in a choice between a safe and
a risky asset, the risky asset is a normal good. This is a common assumption
about preferences.
4.2 A Special Case
i-p i-p
We now consider the special case in which u(ci) = 4>-fz~ an<^ v ( c2) — "\Z~t
with 4> > x and p > 0. Then —
c
fl/ffi
= 1 for all c. In addition, u'(c\) = xv'[c\)
implies that c\ = cKf) 1^ < c}, and consequently, that c\—xk < (c} + fc)(f ) 1//p
for all k > 0. In this case (18') reduces to
(c\ — xk)
JE\Tk)
for all k > 0, which of course holds if
\-X>xp + p™x ; 7/ (19)
l_ x > x/, + /,(£)i/p. (20)
Thus G3(c},cJ,fc) > for all & > holds if /? is sufficiently small. This, in
turn, implies that the inequality in Proposition 2 holds, and that random-
ization is desirable on welfare grounds.
4.3 Supporting the Optimal Stochastic Allocation
We must slightly augment our notation from Section 2 in order to describe
how to implement the optimal stochastic allocation. Consider the savings
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problem of a young agent who faces a random lump-sum tax of r2 (s) when old,
5 = 1,2, where the probability that s = 1 is p, and who faces a deterministic
gross rate of return r. This agent's problem is to choose s to maximize
u(wi —Ti — s) + pv(w2 -t2 (1) + rs) + (1 —p)v(w2 — r2 (2) +rs). The solution
to the problem is a savings function s = f(w\ — ri,u>a— t2 (1),u;2 — ^2(2),r;p).
The optimal random consumption allocation can be supported by the
following policy. The government sells two types of bonds, and imposes
restrictions which prohibit agents from sharing bonds. The bonds sold to type
2 agents are sold in a minimum denomination of F and bear a deterministic
return r. The govenment chooses F and r to satisfy c\ — w x — F and
c\ = w2 + rF. The bonds sold to type 1 agents are sold only in the indivisible
amount F, and bear a gross return r(l) with probability p, and f(2) with
probability 1 — p. The government chooses F, r(l), and r(2) to satisfy
c\ = w 1 -f[w l -F,w2 ^r(l)F,w2 + r(2)F,x-p]; (21)
c
l
2 (l) = w2 + r(l)F + xf(-); (22)
cj(2) = w2 + r(2)F + */(•). (23)
This construction works since, by (14), type 1 agents are "on their savings
functions."
5 Conclusions
We have described an environment in which a government must finance a
fixed deficit of a given size. When some agents have access to reasonable in-
vestment opportunities other than government bonds, government borrowing
is constrained by the desirability of keeping these agents in the bond mar-
ket. However, treating some agents preferentially creates an adverse selection
problem. The optimal solution to these two problems involves price discrim-
ination by the government, and may involve the simultaneous use of bonds
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with random and non-random returns. Interestingly, agents with the best
outside investment opportunities purchase bonds with random returns, and
extraneous randomization of bond returns is observed only when the govern-
ment's revenue needs are sufficiently large. These two features seem to accord
well with the historical observations cited in the Introduction. Moreover, this
borrowing mechanism could also be interpreted as one in which inflation is
random and both indexed and non-indexed government bonds co-exist, or as
one where there is a hierarchy of claims against the government, and bonds
bearing high expected returns are subject to some risk of partial default.
Thus the model has the potential to confront a number of ways in which a
government can borrow using bonds bearing a randomly determined return.
The following features of our model, and their relationship with the recent
literature on randomization, are of some interest. First, in our model random-
ization is desirable even though agents have the same underlying utility func-
tions and endowments. This contrasts with the results in Prescott-Townsend
(1984) and Arnott-Stiglitz (1988), and is due to the fact that agents have
access to (and make differential use of) different non-market activities. Thus
agents' indirect utility functions differ in such a way that randomized al-
locations may be desirable. This insight is essentially the same as that in
Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1990). Second, a type of randomization
consistent with the predictions of our model has been observed historically.
This is of interest because Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) (among others) note
that it is puzzling that randomization of contracts does not occur as fre-
quently as theory suggests. The analysis of government debt contracts in
our model may provide some insight into this puzzle.
Arnott and Stiglitz discuss six reasons why randomization might not be
observed: (1) agents do not understand that randomization is optimal (i.e.,
they are only boundedly rational); (2) contracts involving randomization
are costly to enforce; (3) secondary markets/randomization insurance neu-
tralize the effects of randomization; (4) lotteries are viewed as unfair; (5)
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von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory is deficient; and (6) indi-
viduals do not trust randomization mechanisms. Our theory and historical
observations suggest that reasons (1), (2), (5), and (6) are not persuasive. 5
We also regard reason (4) as unpersuasive because randomization of the type
that we describe (i.e., weakening the self-selection constraint by treating type
l'a preferentially rather than imposing randomization on the relatively dis-
advantaged type 2's, as in Stiglitz (1982)) need not be percieved as unfair
by either group. For example, if bonds with randomized returns were sold
to foreign investors, it is unlikely that domestic investors would view the
implicit taxation of foreign investors as unfair. In contrast, reason (3) may
be an important reason that randomization (even of the type we describe)
has been only periodic throughout history. 6
Because the bond policy that we describe is a form of price discrimina-
tion, it is clear that the existence of secondary markets would render the
government unable to implement its program. That is, implementaion of the
constrained Pareto efficient bond policy that we study requires the govern-
ment to impose legal restictions that prohibit the intermediation of bonds
with randomized returns. It is interesting to note that poorly developed fi-
nancial markets are common in many high inflation countries that choose to
monetize their deficits. For simplicity, we assume an ex cathedra prohibi-
tion against the intermediation of assets. However, Bencivenga and Smith
(1991) study the optimal degree of financial repression in a developing econ-
omy faced with a sustained deficit that must be monetized. They find that
°For example, Weir and Velde (1989) discuss one famous randomization mechanism,
the "thirty French girls," that was very transparent. Lists of young girls from Genevan
families with reputations for longevity and who had survived smallpox were compiled for
use as "nominees" (recall that subscribers could make payments contingent on the survival
of someone other than themselves, but payment required proof of the nominees' survival).
The most common group size was thirty because administrative costs rose with the number
of nominees and the marginal reduction in variance became small after thirty.
bOf course the size of g and x (see the restictions associated with case 2 in Section 4
that make this policy optimal) also vary over the course of an economy's business cycle.
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a government with a deficit (that is either unwilling or unable to decrease
spending or increase explicit taxes) may be required by simple feasibility to
engage in financial repression to support its monetization program. Such
repression is much more difficult in more developed countries and may be
one reason why "lottery bonds" have not been observed in well developed
financial markets.
Finally, another reason that the type of randomization policy we study
has been observed only periodically throughout history may be related to
the question of whether the policy supports a unique stationary equilibrium.
In particular, an open question is whether the method of decentralization
that we describe, based on Bryant and Wallace (1984), also supports other
equilibria. While this must remain a topic for future research, Cooley and
Smith (1990) have shown that the decentralization scheme in the Bryant and
Wallace model can result in severe indeterminacies. In addition, the kinds
of government borrowing schemes we describe may easily permit stationary
sunspot equilibria, such as those described by Shell (1977), Azariadis (1981),
and Cass and Shell (1983), to be observed. [A suggestive example along
these lines appears in Smith (1989)]. Thus the market might add extraneous
uncertainty to that already created by the government. These kinds of possi-
bilities again raise the following interesting question for future research—how
well can the government do, in a welfare sense, if it is constrained to schemes
that have a unique (or a unique stationary) equilibrium?
6 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
For convenience we restate Problem 3.3 with only the binding constraints
displayed
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Problem 3.3.' For i = 1,2, choose c\, c\, and k to maximize
i=l
subject to
2
Y, Oi(c\ + 4) +M ^ w i + w2 - 9 + e \xk (A.1)
"(cll +^l^K^^) (A2)
u(c?) + ufcj) > w(cj + fc) + ^(4 - xk). (A3)
Proof of Proposition 1. Let An > be the Lagrange multiplier associated
with constraint (An), and observe the following.
At interior solutions for c\ and c\, the relevant first order conditions are
u\c\)(d
x + A 2 ) - A3i*'(cJ + *) = Ml (A4)
</(c2 )(0i + A2 ) -WW - lib) = Ml (A5)
The first order condition for k is
A 3 [t/(c2 - xk)x - u'(c| + Jfc)] - Ai0!(l - x) < 0, (A6)
with equality if fc > 0.
Finally, the first order conditions for c\ and c\ at an interior optimum are
u'(c2
l
)(O2 + \ 3 ) = 2\ l . (A7)
•(cJXfc + A3) = Ml (4-8)
Of course (A.7) and (A8) imply that u'(c\ ) = v'(c\).
Now multiply both sides of (A5) by x, subtract the result from (A4),
and use (A6) to eliminate ^i A x (l — x) to obtain
(01 + A2)[*t/(4) - ti'(cj)] < 0, (A9)
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with equality if k > 0.
Clearly, if we establish that k > the proof is complete. Consequently,
suppose by way of contradiction that k = 0. Then (AA) and (A. 5) imply
that u'(c\) = v'(c\). Moreover, since (A.2) is binding, it follows that c] > c^,
for j = 1, 2. But then (A.3) is violated, giving the desired result. This proves
Proposition 1.
7 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by considering the following augmented version of Problem 4.1.
Problem 4.1': Fori = 1,2 and s = 1,2, choose c\, c%2 (s), and k to maximize
E».W4)+M4(i)) + (i-pM4(2))}
subject to: (9) through (11) and
u\c\) = xpv'(c\(l)) + x(l - p)v\c\(2)). (BA)
Since the solution to Problem 4.1 satisfies (B.l), imposition of this constraint
does not alter the optimal choices for the social planner.
Equations (9) through (11), which hold as equalities, and (BA) constitute
four equations involving c}, c^l), c^(2), k, c\, and c\ [since c^(l) = c^(2) =
c\). We now use (9), (11), and (BA) to eliminate c}, cj ( 1 ) , and k from
Problem 4.1'.
First, let (BA) define c\ as a function of c^(l) and c\(2). In particular,
define c\ = a(c2(l),C2(2)). Apparently, c\ = a(c\,c\) holds. In addition,
differentiation of (BA) yields
a1(4(l),4(2))=pI^ffil>0. (B.2)
u yc
x )
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a 2(c'(l),4(2)) = (l-p)x \j\>> >0. (B.Z)
Second, substitute c\ = a(c\(l) , c\(2)) into (9) at equality. This gives k
as a function of c\(\), c\(2), c\, and c\. Thus define k = (3(c\(l), c\(2); cj,^).
Observe that k — (3(c], c\; c\, c\) holds, and that differentiation of /?(•) yields:
A=-(^)<0. (BA)
1 — X
A = -(^)<0. (S.5)
1 — X
Third, substitute c\ = a(c\(l) , c\(2)) and k = /?(•) into (11) at equality.
This defines c\(2) as a function of c^l), Cj, and c^; say ^(2) = 7(02(1); c\, C2).
As before c\ = *){c\; c\,c\). Moreover, differentiation of 7(-) yields
7l (c*;c^c*) = -_£_. (B.6)
1 -p
Finally, define the function <$(•) as follows
«(<4(l);^ ) ^) = U(a(<4(l), 7(-))) + P«'(4(l)) + (l-pM7(-))- (B-7)
Observe that S(-) is the left-hand-side of constraint (10), the (binding) vol-
untary participation constraint for type 1 agents. The function 8(-) expresses
the left-hand-side of this constraint solely as a function of c\{\) and c^, for
j = 1,2. The strategy of the remainder of the proof is to show that S(-) is
locally convex in c^l), so local randomization relaxes the voluntary partici-
pation constraint on type 1 agents and consequently is welfare improving.
Now observe that Problem 4.1' reduces to the following: 7
Problem 4.1". Choose c\, c\, and c\{\) to maximize
u{c\) + v(c22 )
7This follows since u(c\) + pv(c\(l)) + (1 - p)v(c\(2)) = V{wu w 2 ,x) holds.
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subject to:
8(cl(l);clc22 ) >V(Wl ,w2 ,x). (B.8)
If c\(l) = c\ at an optimum, then the solution to Problem 4.1" coincides
with the (non-stochastic) solution to Problem 3.3.
We now establish the following properties of £(•):
6l (cl;c
2
l ,cl) = 0, (B.9)
and if the inequality in Proposition 2 holds,
8u (c
l
2 ;c
2
,cl)>0. (£.10)
Then setting c\(l) ^ c\ (in some neighborhood of c\) relaxes constraint (B.7)
in Problem 4.1". It follows that at an optimum, c\(l) ^ c\, and consequently
c\(l) 7^ ^(2). Thus there will be extraneous randomization of the allocation
received by type 1 agents.
It remains, then, to establish that (B.9) and (B.10) hold. For (B.9),
straightforward differentiation of (B.7) gives
6i(c2;clc
2
2 )
= u'(a(.))[ai + a27l ] +pv'(%) + (1 -p)i/(c*)7i. (£.11)
Substitution of (B.2), (B.3), and (B.6) into (B.ll) gives (B.9)
For (B.10), further differentiation yields
&\\{c\',c\,cl) = w
//
(cl)[ai + a2 7i]
2+u
/
(cJ)[a 1i+Qi27i+»2i7i + »22(7i) 2 +«27ii]
+pv"(c\) + (1 -p)v"{c\)( lx )
2
+ (1 - pWiclhn. (£.12)
It is straightforward but tedious to establish that, when evaluated at (c2 , c\,
an +01271 + «2i7i + 022(71 )
2
+ «27n =
—M^ +l^]^}; (5-13)
p (1 -p) 2 v"(c l2 )
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ai+c*27i = 0; (£.14)
and
7ii(c2 ;c1 ,c2 )(p + xa 1 ) = -
(1 _ rtV/(^ )
-
pV'(cJ - xk){l - x)
(1 - p)
2 [v'(c\ - xk) - u'(c\ + k)]
Substituting (B.13) through (B.15) into (B.12) gives
(5.15)
^i(c2 ,cl5 c2 ) = -j— +
(1 _ pK(ai } + (1
~P)v (c2 )7ii[l +—] -
ggg) _ ^)p(i-x)^-xi)
1-p (l-p)[u'(c|-zfc)-u'(cl + fc)]'
Apparently, ^nfcj; c\,c\) > if the inequality in Proposition 2 holds. This
completes the proof.
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